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LAWYER1NG IN A HYBRID ADVERSARY SYSTEM
JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKT
I. INTRODUCTION
This year, 1996, is the thirtieth anniversary of the publication
of Professor Monroe Freedman's article, Professional Responsi-
bility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Ques-
tions.1 Professor Freedman's article stimulated an intense de-
bate within the legal profession and in society about the basic
tenets of the adversary system. Although the positions advocated
by Professor Freedman were criticized by scholars,' the Ameri-
can Bar Association in 1969 adopted a Canon embracing a law-
yer's duty of zealous representation to clients.' Today, we, as a
society, still debate the merits of the adversary model as a basic
assumption underlying our legal system.4
It is fitting that thirty years later we engage in this dialogue
about the limits of the adversary system. Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow calls upon the proponents of the adversary
* John Redditt Professor of State & Local Government & Professor of Law, The
University of Texas at Austin.
1. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Law-
yer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). Professor Freedman
subsequently elaborated upon his views presented in his article in the book,
LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).
2. E.g., Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L.
REV. 853, 923-24 (1992) (stating that Professor Freedman could have served the law
as well by advocating a different position); Charles W. Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S.
CAL. L. REV. 809, 824-25 n.54 (1977) (recounting the attempted disbarment of Pro-
fessor Freedman for his views).
3. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, reprinted in SELECTED STATUTES
RULES AND STANDARDS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 349 (John S. Dzienkowski ed.,
1994) (noting that the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, including Canon 7,
was enacted in 1969).
4. For example, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY
(1988) and the intense debate that it has stimulated. See Stephen Ellmann, Law-
yering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 116 (1990) (reviewing
LUBAN supra).
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system to bear the burden of proving why adversarialness
should underlie our legal system.5 Professor Menkel-Meadow
argues that society should reconsider the goals of the modern
legal system and the methods used to achieve those goals.6 As
others have pointed out,7 in principle our legal system has be-
gun the shift away from the adversarial model of justice; this
movement, however, is taking place in a haphazard manner
without much study or guidance. I thus commend Professor
Menkel-Meadow's attempt to focus the discussion on a more
deliberate consideration of an ideal model of justice in this
postmodern, multicultural world. Professor, Menkel-Meadow's
article is an important contribution for many reasons. It reminds
us in academe that a schism continues to exist between the
adversarial ethic in theory and in practice. Further, the article
highlights the significant costs that society bears on account of
the legal profession's insistence upon clinging to the tenets of
the adversarial model.
II. "THE TROUBLE WITH THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM"
Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow has written a very powerful
and eloquent challenge to the assumption that adversarial ethics
must underlie the modern legal system. This provocative article
calls upon the proponents of the adversary system to bear the
burden of proving that advergarialness should continue to per-
vade lawyering. In this section, I examine the major points
made in Professor Menkel-Meadow's article.
Professor Menkel-Meadow's article is a call for reevaluating
the goals underlying our system for resolving disputes. We are
all, of course, familiar with the argument that our adjudicative
system produces the best results when parties present opposing,
adverse interests to an impartial, uninvolved judge. We are
5. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 529 (1986) (recognizing that operation of the adversarial system
under modern rules of procedure can be farcical); Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology
and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 301 (1989) (asserting
that "some chinks in the adversarial armor have recently begun to appear").
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familiar, also, with the critique that truth is not a primary goal
of the modern adversary system. Professor Menkel-Meadow's
article takes these traditional arguments and applies them to a
postmodern, multicultural world. Her thesis is that "[mioder
life presents us with complex problems, often requiring complex
and multifaceted solutions" and that the adversary system does
not properly accomplish the goals that we expect of it.'
Professor Menkel-Meadow's critique of the adversary system
in today's society is well executed and well founded. Legal insti-
tutions and the underlying substantive law often do not and
cannot offer parties the remedies9 or factual presentation"
that best fit the legal dispute. The bipolar choices offered in tra-
ditional civil and criminal adjudication often do not reflect the
public and private concerns in the modern legal dispute. This
mismatch between the disputes and the legal system may result
in parties consciously avoiding the modern legal system." Fur-
ther, many cases that end up in the litigation system produce
significant dissatisfaction for all sides involved. 2 Additionally,
the culture of adversarial discourse has been influenced by many
aspects of our society."
Professor Menkel-Meadow uses the postmodern critique to
illustrate the defects in the form of adversarialness as it cur-
8. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 7 (footnote omitted).
9. Professor Menkel-Meadow calls this "limited remedial imaginations." Id. at 7.
10. Professor Menkel-Meadow points out that the adversary system tends to limit
the number of parties that can be involved in a legal dispute. Id. at 9-10. Apart
from addressing a remedy that affects multiple parties, such limitations also affect
the nature of the proceeding and the quality of the view presented. Id.
11. This mismatch is a major reason for the rise in the alternative dispute res-
olution movement. See Kenneth Penegar, Foreword: The Elusive Promise of Legal
Reform, 46 SMU L. REV. 1889, 1898 (1993).
12. See Michal R. Belknap, From Pound to Harley: The Founding of AJS, 72 JU-
DICATURE 78, 83 (1988) (discussing the historical origins of dissatisfaction with the
adversary system).
13. Professor Menkel-Meadow identifies two consequences of using the adversarial
model as a pervasive tenet of our legal system. "[Tlhe 'adversary' model employed in
the courtroom has bled inappropriately into and infected other aspects of lawyering,
including negotiations carried on both 'in the shadow of the court' and outside of it
in lawyers' transactional work." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 6-7 (footnotes
omitted). Also, "the rhetoric and structure of adversarial discourse prevents not just
better and nicer behavior, but more accurate and open thinking." Id. at 10 (footnote
omitted).
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rently appears in our legal system. She first points out that the
imposition of a lawyer's duties to the specific client complicates
the concept of oppositional presentation of facts in the legal
profession. 14 The duty to the client, therefore, often interferes
with the legal system's search for the truth. Then Professor
Menkel-Meadow raises the teachings of postmodernism that
question the existence of a truth, or whether "there are immuta-
ble, universal, global, and discoverable facts or interpretations of
facts." 5 Complicating the discovery of truth are the filters that
individuals use to process information, filters that undoubtedly
have "impact... on the finding of facts, the interpretation of the
law and the production of 'legal knowledge'." 6 From this per-
spective, Professor Menkel-Meadow offers a powerful critique of
the usefulness of the adversary system in modern society.
Ultimately, Professor Menkel-Meadow says that society
should not continue to mildly tinker with the current adversarial
model of justice. Instead, we should reevaluate the goals for our
adjudication system and decide the role of truth, policy consider-
ations, individual parties' choice, and fairness of outcomes. 7
In this self-evaluation, Professor Menkel-Meadow believes that
society will not so dearly embrace the goals of the adversary
system. Instead, our multicultural world more likely will prefer
searches for the truth, long term commitment to the fairness of
the dispute resolution system, nonnmonetary solutions to prob-
lems and multiparty involvement in disputes. 8 I believe that
Professor Menkel-Meadow is correct about society's dissatisfac-
tion with the current legal system. I worry, however, about
majoritarian control over changing the legal system without
sufficient checks and balances to protect the minority.
14. Id. at 17-18.
15. Id. at 14.





III. INFLUENCE OF THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL UPON LAWYERING
Many scholars argue that the pure form of adversarial justice
has long been abandoned in many aspects of our legal system.' 9
Since 1983, the ABA has removed the duty of zealous represen-
tation from its national ethics code."0 Further, the ABA has
reaffirmed explicitly a duty upon lawyer-advocates that over-
rides client interests when a client commits a fraud on the tribu-
nal.2 Additionally, the ethics rules proscribe lawyer involve-
ment in client crimes and frauds.2
Furthermore, there have been significant changes in the man-
ner in which lawyers litigate cases in this country. As Professor
Resnik so aptly characterized in her Harvard Law Review arti-
cle,' managerial judges use their supervisory powers to become
actively involved in all aspects of the litigation process, in-
cluding in settlement discussions. Reforms in discovery prac-
tices have further moved the process away from the traditional
adversarial model in which parties present their cases to an
imperial and impartial judge.26 Further, reforms in Rule 1127
and recognition of inherent judicial powers to sanction parties
and counsel for court have also undercut the adversarial model
19. See id.; Resnik, supra note 7; Sward, supra note 7.
20. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1969) with
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.1-1.3 (1994).
21. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1994) (discussing
candor to the tribunal).
22. See id. Rules 1.2(d), 1.16.
23. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
24. Of course, case management is more common in large complex cases and in
class action matters. Cf id. at 443 (noting that a high level of judicial intervention
is not required in most cases where the number of discovery requests is small). The
practice, however, of hands-on judging has pervaded the adjudicatory methods used
in many smaller disputes. See id. at 379 (stating that under recent revisions to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "virtually all cases" require case management).
25. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and
Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985) (dis-
cussing how mandatory settlement conferences threaten the appropriate role of judg-
es in the adjudicatory process).
26. There have been several waves of discovery reform which amended Rule 26 in
1970, 1980, 1983 and 1993. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note. Similarly,
Rule 37 was amended in 1980 and 1993. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee's note.
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Rule 11 was modified in 1983 and in 1993. See id. adviso-
ry committee's note.
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of justice." Our legal system quickly has embraced alternative
dispute resolution both as a substitute for the trial and as a
court annexed feature of the litigation process.
Despite the inroads made toward cutting back the adversarial
system, adversarial behavior is prevalent in the legal system."
Clearly, a gap exists between theory and practice. Although
academics continue to teach the death of the adversarial model,
it is alive and well in practice. I now offer several examples of
this schism between theory and practice.
For example, the ethics rules are quite unequivocal about a
lawyer's duty to disclose client fraud on the tribunal."0 In fact,
this duty is better understood by the criminal defense bar, espe-
cially court appointed criminal defense lawyers,3 than it is by
civil litigators. The extent to which lawyers in civil litigation
follow their obligation of candor to the court is unclear. 2 Civil
litigators often claim that they are uncertain about the truth.
Sometimes this ignorance of the truth is the result of disregard-
ing the information or not inquiring too much. On other occa-
sions civil litigators may simply disobey the legal requirement
of disclosure."3
28. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (holding that it is within a
district court's inherent power to sanction attorneys for bad faith conduct). Cf Shep-
herd v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 62 F.3d 1469 (D.C.Cir. 1995) (al-
lowing reasonable punitive sanctions against lawyers for bad faith conduct).
29. Cf. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHIcs OF LAWYERING,
469-71 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing "[how [aidversarial ... the [aidversarial [slystem
[is]"). Professors Hazard, Koniak, and Cramton note that the "adversarial model may
be more of a myth than a reality in many common settings." Id. at 469. They point
to high rates of settlement and evidence of cooperative behavior in "routine matters
handled on a high-volume basis." Id. at 469-70. They conclude by stating that "Per-
haps two trends are proceeding simultaneously: a more aggressive adversarial ethic
in high-stakes litigation having a zero-sum character, and a more bureaucratic, coop-
erative mode of dispute resolution in many areas of law practice involving a high
volume of fairly routine claims." Id. at 471.
30. "A lawyer shall not knowingly: . . . fail to disclose a material fact to a tribu-
nal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a
client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 3.3(a)(2) (1994). See ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 353 (1987) (Lawyer's
Responsibility With Relation to Client Perjury).
31. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166-71 (1986) (asserting that a lawyer's
failure to allow perjured testimony is not ineffective assistance of counsel).
32. See, e.g., Abraham P. Ordover, Lawyer as Liar, 2 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 305,
313-20 (1979) (stating that deceptive practices are often employed by attorneys).
33. Model Rule 3.3 only requires disclosure when the lawyer knows that the client
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As another example, the ethics rules are relatively clear about
the distinction between lawyers delineating the scope of the law
and lawyers assisting clients in crimes or frauds against third
parties.34 The last decade of litigation against lawyers in the
banking industry provides a vivid image of lawyers advocating
aggressive positions for clients." A particular example of the
application of adversarialness in the banking regulatory process
involves the Kaye, Scholer Lincoln Savings representation. 6 In
that celebrated matter, the law firm adopted the position that it
was in a litigation posture and thus did not need to comply with
any government disclosure obligations in the investigation of a
Lincoln Savings fraud. The only constraint against such in-
volvement seems to be the potential civil and criminal penalties
that can attach when a lawyer or law firm assists clients in
committing and concealing crimes and frauds.2 8
is committing a criminal or fraudulent act upon the tribunal. MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 3.3 (1994). Thus, if the lawyer does not know, but, rather,
only suspects a criminal or fraudulent act, then the lawyer has no duty of disclo-
sure. See id. Lawyers can avoid asking the question so that they do not know (simi-
lar to the debate in criminal law over whether a lawyer should ask a client whether
the client committed the act as alleged by the prosecutor). Lawyers may also feel
that candor to the court does not apply in depositions or that their obligation to
disclose is removed if the case is settled before it gets to trial.
34. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2(d), 1.16 (1994).
35. For a very interesting article examining how lawyers could have stayed quiet
during their clients' fraudulent transactions, see Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were
the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud,
46 VAND. L. REV. 75 (1993).
36. See Developments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Re-
sponses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1615-18 (1994) (discussing securities regulations
aimed at curbing lawyer abuse).
37. Where were all the lawyers? See Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F.
Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990); John S. Dzienkowski, The Impact of Failed Financial
Institution Litigation on the Regulation of Lawyers, 12 REV. LIT. 513, 516-18 (1993).
38. In the banking context, Congress enacted several statutes to strengthen law
firms' criminal and civil liability to the regulatory system. See Competitive Equality
Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (codified at scattered sec-
tions of 2, 5, 12, 15, 26, & 31 U.S.C.); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 11, 12, 18, 20, 28,
31, 42 & 45 U.S.C.); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended at scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.); Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.); see generally Manual R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty
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In litigation practice, two examples exist in which the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly sought to cut back on the ad-
versarial nature of the litigation process. In 1983, Rule 11 was
amended to impose mandatory sanctions on parties and/or coun-
sel who file motions in court that were not well grounded in fact,
well founded in law, or were not based upon a proper purpose.39
From most accounts, a decade of practice with Rule 11 produced
substantial evidence that the rule of procedure had an impact
upon litigation practices.40 In 1993, Rule 11 was modified to
make its application discretionary and to add a twenty-one day
safe harbor to allow counsel to withdraw pleadings that violate
the rule's standards.4' Under the new Rule 11, it appears that
litigation practice today largely ignores the requirements of the
rule." Thus, without the threat of mandatory sanctions or firm
responsibilities to the court, judges and lawyers prefer to allow
the filing of frivolous motions and to let the court system ferret
through the arguments made by counsel.
In the other example, in 1993, Congress amended the discov-
ery rules to allow federal district courts to process litigation
under a system of open discovery.4" In open discovery, counsel
Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1657 (1994) (discussing civil penalties assessed
through malpractice liability).
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983); id. advisory committee's note.
40. See 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1331 (2d ed. 1990). The rule was mandatory; in other words, judges
were required to impose sanctions if a violation was found. Id. Sanctions included an
award of the opposing side's attorneys' fees to fight the frivolous filing. Id. Thus,
the rule became a fee-shifting rule for cases weak on the facts or the law, or those
filed for an improper purpose.
41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993); James R. Simpson,
Note, Why Change Rule 11? Ramifications of the 1992 Amendment Proposal, 29 CAL.
W. L. REV. 495, 503-12 (1993).
42. Although all the data on new Rule 11 is not in yet, anecdotal evidence sup-
ports a conclusion that judges and lawyers have largely moved away from any regu-
lation of lawyer conduct in the filing of frivolous motions. There seems to be very
little activity in the federal courts on the new rule. Laura Duncan, Sanctions Litiga-
tion Declining: Decrease Attributed to One-Year-Old Safe-Harbor Amendments to Rule
11, ABA J., Mar. 1995, at 17. It is important to note that the court does not see a
Rule 11 complaint filed by a party uniil the 21-day safe harbor has passed and the
alleged violator does not correct the conduct that is the object of the complaint.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 40, § 1331 (Supp. 1996).
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (providing that initial disclosures shall commence
without formal discovery request).
HYBRID ADVERSARY SYSTEM
and parties must submit all documents that are relevant to the
litigation and to the opposing parties. This system of discovery
opposes the traditional discovery process of interrogatories and
document production that can be charitably referred to as a
strategic game whereby the more skillful advocate can either
compel or avoid compulsion of relevant evidence in litigation.
One would think that society would welcome open discovery.
Fewer than one-third of the federal courts, however, have chosen
to stay with the open discovery procedures." The culture of the
legal profession still continues to resist movements away from
the adversarial model.
As Professor Menkel-Meadow has noted, the adversarial ethic
continues to pervade nonlitigation areas and alternative dispute
resolution.45 In the alternative dispute resolution area, as more
and more lawyers have become involved with mediation and-
arbitration, these means of resolving disputes have adopted
many of the features of the litigation system.46 Moreover, in
many areas of nonlitigation practice, lawyers have infused the
process with adversarial techniques."
One additional example of the influence of adversarial ethos
upon the legal profession involves Geoffrey Hazard's attempt to
revive Brandeis's "counsel for the situation"48 in Model Rule
2.2." In pushing the adoption of the lawyer-as-intermediary
44. The rule itself allows federal district courts to opt out of the open discovery
provision. Id. (stating that local rules can govern initial discovery). About two-thirds
of the federal district courts have opted out. Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman,
The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 762 (1995). Of those
courts that opted out of open discovery, some of them have local court rules that
place more obligations on counsel than does Rule 26(2)(b). Id. at 762-64.
45. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 37.
46. When one takes a course out of one of the recent editions of the dispute reso-
lution casebooks, one sees adversarial and strategic behavior appearing in mediation,
arbitration, and negotiation. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 17-101 (2d ed. 1992) (excerpting
from articles, asking questions, and making notes about the competitive model of
negotiation).
47. The best example involves adversarial behavior that appears in the competi-
tive model of negotiation. See id.
48. Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis As People's Lawyer,
105 YALE L.J. 1445, 1502-11 (1996) (providing a detailed discussion of the origin and
meaning of Brandeis's often-quoted phrase).
49. See John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers As Intermediaries: The Representation of
1996]
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rule, Professor Hazard sought to legitimize for the legal profes-
sion the concept of a middle role for a lawyer that would adjust
the rights and responsibilities of two or more clients seeking to
enter into a transaction or resolve a dispute. 0 In the early
1980s, it was anticipated that clients would have a need for the
lawyer who acted as an intermediary. In drafting the Model
Rules, advocates of the mediation process quickly excluded their
services from the ambit of Model Rule 2.2. Although most states
that adopted the Model Rules enacted this provision, few law-
yers ever admit that they act as intermediaries in practice. This
lack of recognition signifies that either lawyers do act as inter-
mediaries but refuse to admit their role change, or they refuse to
act in such a capacity. Although one can point to many problems
in Model Rule 2.2,"' I believe that part of the resistance to this
rule comes from the fact that it flies in the face of the adversary
model. Acknowledging that attorneys can act as intermediaries
implicitly acknowledges that lawyers and their multiple clients
can benefit from nonadversarial relationships.
In summary, it is easy to show that our legal system is in a
hybrid state of affairs, caught between the ethos of the adver-
sary model and efforts to temper the costs of adversarialness.
Some scholars, like Professor Monroe Freedman,52 decry the
efforts to move away from adversarial justice. At the same time,
others see the pervasive influence of adversarialness in our
current justice system and recognize that in some instances the
costs of adversarialness outweigh the associated benefits. The
costs of such a hybrid system, however, are equally significant to
society. Those costs bolster Professor Menkel-Meadow's call for a
reconsideration of our adherence to the adversarial ethos and
indicate that her conclusion that the system's goals need re-
evaluation is both timely and necessary.
Multiple Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 757 &
n.85 (noting that Professor Hazard was instrumental in formulating Rule 2.2).
50. Id.
51. See generally id. (describing problems in Model Rule 2.2).




IV. THE FUTURE OF THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
A. The Reasons Underlying the Legal Profession's Admiration of
the Adversary System
Several reasons exist to support the legal profession's contin-
ued embrace of the adversary system as the best means of re-
solving disputes. The most fundamental justification for
adversarialism involves the psychology of change. A vast majori-
ty of lawyers in this country were trained using the adversarial
ethos as an immutable assumption underlying our justice sys-
tem. Those lawyers' entire perspective on lawyering comes from
this view that the adversarial system is immutable and they feel
very comfortable with the basic tenets of adversarialness.53
Thus, any change from the current system presents the strains
and tension that accompany most changes in human experience.
Lawyers are wary of any radical change because they are
uncertain about the system that might replace the adversarial
model.54 American lawyers' global counterparts have not always
enjoyed the best of careers. Changes in the American system
could lead to similar results: lawyering could become more min-
isterial, or it could become less of a profession and more open to
competition from other nonlawyers. Lawyers, understandably,
would feel uncomfortable giving up the power, prestige, and
income that is bestowed upon one of the most hated professions
in this country.55
The fact that individual lawyers feel comfortable with our
legal system influences many institutions in this country. Law
firms embrace the adversary system as do such professional
organizations as the American Bar Association and the Ameri-
can Law Institute. As lawyers continue to dominate politics,
either directly as elected officials or behind the scenes as advi-
sors, our legislative and executive branches firmly believe in the
tenets of the adversary system. It is easy, therefore, to explain
53. Lawyers particularly believe in the binary presentation of facts to an impartial
judge. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 6.
54. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 42.
55. See Lynn Ludlow, Lawyers and Hate Jokes, S.F. EXAMINER, July 15, 1993, at
A16; Dale Dauten, For Executives Only: In This Case the Winning Lawyers Saw the
Light, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St.Paul), July 27, 1994, at 2D.
1996]
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why change has been so incremental and why changes in ethical
rules have not resulted in widespread compliance.
The legal profession also has a self-interest in preserving the
adversarial system. Law firms and lawyers make the majority of
their money by billing time.56 The adversarial model of resolv-
ing disputes presumes the involvement of lawyers at every stage
of the process. Furthermore, adversarialness tends to separate
the parties from each other-thus increasing the likelihood that
the lawyers will spend more time and also bill larger fees. The
judiciary also has an interest in preserving the legal system as
an adversarial institution. Most judges enjoy the power and
prestige that accompany the position. Politicians view judicial
appointments as important to preserving the balance of political
power in judicial decision making.57
B. Reforming the Adversarial System
A major thesis of Professor Menkel-Meadow's article is that
adversarialness unthinkingly dominates much of legal process
and discourse. She suggests that society should examine care-
fully which cases require binary solutions and which would
benefit from another approach.58 Professor Menkel-Meadow
notes that she would limit the adversary system to where appro-
priate, by party choice, and as a court of last resort.59 As was
stated earlier in this Comment, she urges society to rethink the
prioritization of goals for a legal dispute resolution system.
Professor Menkel-Meadow does offer a broad suggestion for
replacing the adversarial model. She suggests that society tailor:
56. Of course, personal injury lawyers often earn their fees through the contingent
fee system, and public interest lawyers earn their fees from fee-shifting statutes.
Flat-rate billing arrangements also have become increasingly common.
57. See Larry W. Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69 B.U. L. REV.
273, 279-82 (1989) (asserting that the function of the appointments clause is to en-
sure the independence of the judiciary even though political values often influence
decision making).
58. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 34. Professor Menkel-Meadow acknowledges
that in many legal disputes the parties are free to opt out of the legal process to
resolve the dispute through creative negotiation. Id. at 24-25. She believes, however,
that settlements are often constrained by "the limited remedial imagination of law-
yers who bargain 'in the shadow of both the court and the law'." Id.
59. See id. at 42-44.
[Vol. 38:45
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different ways to structure process in our legal system to
reflect our multiple goals and objectives. For example, to
achieve the goal of determining criminal guilt a different
process may be required than is required for allocating mon-
ey or human, parental, or civil rights. Sometimes, other pro-
cesses, such as mediation, inquisitorial-bureaucratic investi-
gation, public fora or conversations, "intermediate sites of dis-
course," private problem-solving (negotiation) or group negoti-
ation and coalition and consensus building would resolve
better the legal and other issues involved.0
The key is to perform a serious and meaningful reexamination of
disputes and different methods for resolving them.
As potential alternative dispute resolution systems, Professor
Menkel-Meadow lists: (1) multi-party proceedings or mediation,
(2) reg-neg or regulatory negotiation, (3) multiparty representa-
tional diverse conversation, (4) civil inquisitorial investigative
procedure where there is a genuine search for the truth, (5)
appropriate dispute resolution without the corruptive influence
of adversarialness, (6) fact finding, (7) third party neutraling,
and (8) judging.6' The choice of proper system depends upon
the individual facts and circumstances of each dispute as well as
on the parties' choice.
Menkel-Meadow's message is that the adversary system can-
not be changed through a series of changes in the ethics rules or
procedural rules. Cultural change is needed. Such change should
be accomplished by cabining the adversary system where it does
its job best and then to consider other forms of conflict and dis-
pute resolution and begin to evaluate their strengths and weak-
nesses.
Professor Menkel-Meadow also points out that any changes in
dispute resolution will require a change in the law of lawyering
and legal ethics. This is a very important point. Legal ethics
will need to be tailored to the varying processes and lawyers will
occupy many different roles: "moral activists, problem solvers,
60. Id. at 11-12 (footnotes omitted).
61. Id. at 32-44 (proposing reforms to the adversary system).
62. Id. at 38-40.
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lawyers for the situation... discretionary lawyers, civic republi-
cans, or statesmen. . . ."' One could make a good case that the
current law of lawyering presents a significant obstacle to inno-
vation in lawyering. For example, Brandeis's efforts to be a
lawyer for the situation later were used against him in confir-
mation hearings.' Lawyers who wish to represent multiple
parties must conform to conflicts of interests standards which
may differ by jurisdiction and court.65 Thus for lawyers to even
consider some of the proposed adjudication processes listed by
Professor Menkel-Meadow, the profession must remove the ad-
versary ethics from the law of lawyering.
C. The Role of Legal Education in Our Move Away from the
Adversary System
If society is to embark upon Professor Menkel-Meadow's goal
of reevaluating the adversary system of justice, institutions in
legal education must open the way for changing the manner in
which lawyers are educated in this country. To this end, the
W.M. Keck Foundation offers an impetus to a number of schools
to experiment with new teaching techniques in legal ethics.66
Much more needs to be done, to educate both lawyers already in
the profession and law students.
Currently, most law school teaching is done in the context of
adversarial litigation. Professors guide students with casebooks
containing appellate decisions produced in this adversarial mod-
el. The educational mind-set is to teach students to argue both
sides of a legal issue-the application of law to facts is best
achieved through a presentation and examination of both sides
63. Id. at 43-44.
64. See Dzienkowski, supra note 49, at 748-57; see also John P. Frank, The Legal
Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1965) (discussing Brandeis's
situational ethics).
65. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1994).
66. See Symposium, Teaching Legal Ethics, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Sum-
mer/Autumn 1995.
67. The legal profession must find some source of funds to conduct empirical re-
search about the laws and procedures that are in place in this country. Legislatures
and scholars often make assumptions that have no founding in empirical study. The
development of the law would benefit significantly from more information about
which rules produce intended and unintended consequences.
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of the case. In teaching how to argue both sides, students are
often taught to adopt positions on behalf of clients that lay indi-
viduals would not be able to argue with a straight face. Students
often expand their notion of colorable arguments and even make
arguments that border on the frivolous.68 Of course, I am not
suggesting that law schools abandon the case method. I just
think that law schools should encourage the development of
classes and teaching methodology that embraces nonadversarial
models of dispute resolution.
Education and study should not end with the law schools.
Lawyers, judges, and public officials need to be educated about
the existence of alternative forms of dispute resolution and
about the need to consider innovation in lawyering. Those indi-
viduals also need information from empirical studies so as to
better perform their tasks and inform their decisions. Without
such educational and informational changes, it. will be difficult
to successfully implement any meaningful shift away from the
adversary ethos.
D. Transactional Costs of Changing Our Adversarial Model
My major criticism of a change from our current system of
litigation involves the transactional costs that accompany any
drastic change. When society makes incremental changes toward
and away from adversarialness, it does not require us to rethink
entire facets of the legal system. A major shift away from the
adversarial model will call into question many established insti-
tutions. I particularly worry about its effect on those individuals
in the lower economic classes.
For example, contingent fee representation provides many
individuals access to legal services without cost unless they are
successful in litigation. 9 It is not difficult to imagine that the
68. I am not suggesting that law professors teach students to make frivolous argu-
ments. I am just pointing out that the Socratic method and the teaching of law
through litigated cases often leads students to believe that lawyers should be able to
make any argument on behalf of a client. In fact, law professors frequently see such
misguided arguments on examinations.
69. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 29, at 530-32. The authors note that the con-
tingent fee is often considered to be the "'poor man's key to the courthouse door" as
well as discussing the criticisms of the contingent fee. Id. at 532 (citation omitted).
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availability of nonadversarial models of dispute resolution dis-
cussed by Professor Menkel-Meadow would create many diffi-
culties for clients or attorneys who rely on contingent fee ar-
rangements. The very existence of more nonmonetary remedies
complicates the contingent fee representation. If clients could
choose between monetary or nonmonetary remedies, a conflict of
interest may be accentuated between the lawyer and the cli-
ent." Of course, one could use a mixed contingent fee/fixed fee
to allow a lawyer to collect an hourly rate when a client accepts
a nonmionetary settlement.7 Such arrangements, however,
could potentially impact clients who do not have the economic
wealth to pay for such choices. 2
Another example of the difficulties of alternative dispute reso-
lution systems involves access to legal services for all of the
other parties that could become involved in multiparty dispute
resolution. For example, in a community mediation of a gang
problem, one would need to decide whether the participants
need legal services, whether the city or police could bring their
own lawyers, and the extent of the legal services that the media-
tion would require. Each of these questions presents a very
difficult issue that may only be answered with very broad guide-
lines. It is imperative, however, that such systems be designed
with careful and deliberate study and thought.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the last thirty years, the adversarial model of lawyering
has been under assault. The debate has shifted from an outright
defense of the model to a series of arguments about specific
contours. In many situations, the ultimate defense of
adversarialism is based upon the fatalistic view that no better
system exists. There is no doubt that the legal profession has
made a piecemeal move away from the pure adversarial model.
The changes have taken place in a haphazard manner without a
70. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.7(b) (1994).
71. Lawyers have used mixed-fee agreements or options to convert a contingent
fee into a fee based upon hourly billing when certain circumstances are met.
72. If the client could not afford the fee based upon hourly rate billing, then the
client would need to reject settlement offers primarily focusing on nonmonetary relief.
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study of the overall picture.
I commend Professor Menkel-Meadow's attempt to try to
focus the debate upon a more deliberative consideration of an
ideal model of justice in this postmodern, multicultural world. I
agree with the observation that no one model will work in all
cases; we must develop different structures to address the special
aspects of the different contexts. Further, a new system must
have sufficient flexibility to allow the parties to best tailor their
dispute resolution mechanism to their more individualized goals.
I am less optimistic than Professor Menkel-Meadow that such
changes can be made efficiently. The adversarial ethic is a per-
vasive influence-almost a religion unto itself-that permeates
our legal system. Changes will continue to occur on a haphazard
basis without much empirical study. Thus, society will continue
to live with the high costs of adversarialness for many decades
to come.
